by Robert Cox & Kees Rietveld
In early July, NATO heads of state and government met for their annual summit, this in the Turkish capital, Ankara. It was the climax of many months of growing strain on the Atlantic alliance. There was no bust -up in Ankara. Trump rolled out his obsession (or stagecraft display?) with Greenland. He stressed accelerated US troop withdrawals from Europe. The issue of European defence spending rumbled on – and, in the background, the issue of how much of that money will buy European or American defence purchases. The tests of the Alliance will come in the months ahead. In this essay two European authors take the long view, starting with the Alliance’s birth, through its heyday years of the Cold War, until the increasing strains which have brought it to the sorry pass in which it is today.
We shall argue that there is consistency even now in America’s attitude towards Europe. The doom-scenario of America ditching NATO and Europe is countered by another analysis – America preferring to stick it out in Europe, if only to keep its leverage over European policy and behaviour. Finally, we shall see the illusions, in any foreseeable future, of Europe developing an alternative to the Atlantic Alliance, despite howling about US perfidy. We shall examine too the limits of any European alternative to the US as a champion of rules-based international order.
Healing and Renewal
Our zone of attention here starts essentially from the last quarter of the 20th century. But we should recall the deeper context of the post-World War II building of a new order fostering prosperity and security in which the US led the way. One major product was today’s European Union which, inter alia, has helped Europe wean itself off its centuries-old imperialist instincts. Europe, notably Britain, was forced in 1956 by the US to abandon its foolhardy invasion of Egypt. In 1970, Britain abandoned the Trucial States (today’s United Arab Emirates). This left a Middle East power gap which, once freed of the shackles of its Vietnam war, and confronted by the world oil crisis and, in 1979, by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the US filled with the Carter Doctrine of January 1980. Henceforth, the Persian Gulf became a no-go area under the stewardship of the United States.
The tilt of US power priorities eastwards and away from Europe was underway. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990 accelerated the process. Barely a decade later the resurgence of Russia under Putin changed the context again. But the strains of and question-marks over Europe’s partnership with the US in NATO had already gathered momentum.
There is more consistency in US policy and practice towards its allies than meets the eye. Trump follows standard US policy, with merely a more buffoonish presentation. If you look from afar, the processes are the same over several administrations. Take the Iran – Iraq war of 1980-88, or the Iraq war of 1991, or sanctions in the nineties, the Iraq war of 2003, the threatened Iran war 2006, the Iran war of 2026. That is arguably one policy from Reagan to Trump. The Europeans weren’t asked for their views – they had to put up with US decisions.
A Cooling Alliance
Events since winter 2025-26 have sharpened doubts. Many Europeans are increasingly convinced that America is gradually withdrawing from the Atlantic Alliance. Hitherto staunch US allies such as Poland and Denmark have doubts about the US commitment to NATO.
The quarrel over Greenland, which Trump threatened to grab, may have cooled for the moment. But it has left a scar in Europe, not just in Denmark, which is shedding some of its euroscepticism.
Trade friction still threatens, despite the summer 2025 “Turnberry” deal struck between Trump and EU Commission President von der Leyen. In May, the EU provisionally ratified the Turnberry trade deal, allowing sustained scrutiny by a European Parliament wary of Trump’s trade unpredictability. The deal still means the highest US tariffs against European goods in 85 years. European moves (in the name of “sovereignty”) to curb the power of US high-tech in its territory promises further irritation. Turnberry contained US commitments to supply more natural gas to Europe. Some Europeans doubt the US will meet that commitment.
What brought us to this pass?
A New Twist
An almost ideological cloud seems to have descended on trans-Atlantic relations. In mid-December 2025, Washington published its National Security Strategy (NSS). In this major policy paper, the US has arguably opened a hiatus in its post-World War II relationship with Europe. European capitals are still trying to grasp the implications of the NSS’s destructive language, such as its assertion that Europe faces “civilisation erasure.” Then, in January, Washington followed up with its National Defense Strategy telling Europe henceforth to look after its own security. Arguably, this is the logical extension of what Washington has been telling Europe for some time.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, at the Munich Security Conference in mid-February, seemingly sought to re-assure Europeans of US fidelity. He was unconvincing. The National Security Strategy remains the last word from Washington. In late March, Donald Trump fanned the flames with his seemingly strongest threat yet to abandon NATO. The war with Iran has turned up the heat still further as European statements such as “this is not our war” are met by US condemnations of European “cowardice”.
Europe has its own war – Ukraine. Ukraine is all yours, Europe, Washington seems to be saying. Some even think that America is in cahoots with Russia, ready to do a deal with Putin, over the heads of both Kiev and Europe, that would sell out the Ukrainians with no guarantees that Russia could not then start its imperialist surge all over again. The EU is now accelerating the process of Ukrainian membership in the bloc. Over the horizon is further enlargement of the Union – its contribution to geopolitical stability.
What Next?
NATO Article 5 and all that. French President Charles de Gaulle famously said that the US wouldn’t risk nuclear Armageddon for an attack on, say, Riga. Why indeed should citizen voters of Alabama, Arizona, or Massachusetts want to defend Europe when there is no related, tangible threat to America involved? This has been long coming. We thought it would be more gradual. Tucker Carlson presumably reflects a wide spectrum of American public opinion. In an interview in the reputable Hamburg weekly, Die Zeit, on May 7, Carlson said “I really do not know why there is NATO.” When the interviewer said “defense,” Carlson retorted: “against whom and why?”.
The pressing question is how credible is any European approach to stepping up its own defense autonomy? There are several paths towards an answer.
Article 42.7 of the EU Treaty commits member states to provide “aid and assistance” in case of attack on one of them. Partly in reaction to the US pressure, but with the Russian threat a stark reality, Europe is boosting its defense spending. Two other factors condition this effort: the extent of public readiness to sacrifice hard-won social benefits to pay for defense; and the need for economic strength and higher competitivity to provide the necessary resources. Both of those are under Europe’s current political spotlight.
Europe’s Limits
´In the face of growing external pressures on our competitiveness and prosperity, it is more important than ever for the European Union to accelerate its economic homework.” (António Costa, president of the European Council of Heads of State and Government) after its mid-June meeting.)
Although we moan about Europe’s shortcomings, Europe is rich – in population, economic and financial wealth, intellectual capacity. And, so far, in political stability
The European Union, ultimately a grandchild of American common sense and inspiration after World War II, is the sum of the priorities of its member states. This is not a federation à l’américaine. It acts slowly. It requires unanimity among its 27 member states to take foreign policy and security decisions. Its priority to enhance its credibility is to get its economy right, despite (or because of) the new challenge unleashed by the wars in the Middle East. Several European leaders sit uneasily in their seats. France faces a highly unpredictable presidential election. Germany’s governing coalition wobbles. Off the EU coast, a United Kingdom, still smitten by the foolishness of its precipitate departure from the European Union (Brexit), flounders in uncertainty. In much of Europe, extreme right and left political movements threaten European cohesion still further and, rather than bid for a stronger European defense capacity, would be tempted by deals with an unreliable Moscow.
And yet there is the “weird resilience” of the EU as Janan Ganesh put it in the Financial Times (260416).
We have seen that a more competitive Europe remains central to its quest for defense and security autonomy. By the early 2020s Europe’s economic regression on the world scale became increasingly apparent, both by comparison with the US and increasingly in the shadow of a rampant China. The effects of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the COVID pandemic made things worse. Europe’s already high energy costs got worse – revealing how weak was an economy with an economic heartland based on energy guzzling heavy industries. The European Council of Heads of State and Government invited former Italian Premiers Mario Draghi and Enrico Letta, to propose ways to reform. Their reports’ numerous proposals notably included: make the European single market a competitive reality, freed of national exceptions and restrictions; slim down Europe’s antiquated industrial structure; mobilise Europe’s abundant savings to finance new generation enterprise in the new technologies and in infrastructure.
While the Draghi-Letta scheme is slowly but surely taking shape, the EU will be struggling to get agreement by year’s end on its 5-year Multiannual Financial Framework negotiation – its medium-term budget plan for 2028 to 2034. At the heart of the current exercise of resource allocation, two expenditure headings dominate – defense and modern economic competitivity. At the expense, of course, of slashing money for support programs beloved, particularly, of poorer member countries, such as farm support and structural funds. The result of this fight will tell us much about the pattern of EU priorities to come. And about some of the conditions and constraints under which the Trans-Atlantic partnership will function. Imagine telling American farmers they’ll get fewer federal bucks because you must buy more guns, and you will see the point.
Time for Choices
There needs perhaps to be a European “Boston Tea Party” to wake everyone up. Too much of the NATO process goes in one direction. For example, no European nation was consulted over the pull out of Afghanistan. Europeans were excluded from the negotiations with Russia. Sentiment is widespread that we are treated as vassals, not as equals. This sense has frequently permeated transatlantic dialogue and fostered mutual mistrust.
America’s progressive withdrawal from international responsibility could, say some, offer Europe scope to become a new inspiration for rules-based world order. But recent lessons from the Conference of the Parties (COP) forum for promoting more sensible environmental behavior, the decline of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and the struggles of UN agencies such as WHO, UNHCR, and UNWRA, as well as the ICJ, are not encouraging. America may have deserted these fora. Nobody is stepping forward as a credible leadership alternative.
These are the sorts of things that the Atlantic partnership should be addressing in genuine dialogue rather than pulling itself apart. More diplomacy, more listening, and fewer ukases must be our guidelines for the conduct of the partnership.
Robert Cox, born in London in 1938, read economics, politics, German and Slavonic languages at Cambridge University and the College of Europe. He launched into journalism with the Economist in London, and later in central Africa. Cox then entered a second career with the European Commission, first in the Spokesman’s service, then in the private office of Commission Member George Thomson. After a spell with the development department dealing with policy & economics and North-South dialogue development negotiations, he was appointed head of the EC Mission in Turkey where he experienced the 1980 military takeover. On return to Brussels, he held senior policy and management posts with the EC information services. On the outbreak of civil war in Yugoslavia, Cox was detached to the EC Monitoring Mission in Zagreb. In 1992, he joined the new EC Humanitarian Office (ECHO) as its deputy head. Since retirement he has based himself in Brussels spending time painting, traveling, and working on contemporary challenges facing the EU.
Cornelis FW Rietveld, born in Haarlem, a physician and international lawyer, has decades of experience in leading major programs in humanitarian assistance, health, and post conflict reconstruction in highly volatile circumstances. He has senior management experience with European Commission agencies, several UN agencies, as well as US and UK governmental agencies. Speaking 10 languages, including Kurdish, Persian, Dari, and Arabic, he has been based since 1987 in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Jordan, Iran, Sudan, Gaza, Somalia, DRC, Kenya, East Timor, Liberia, Uganda, Central African Republic, Burundi, Benin, Madagascar, Kosovo, and Romania. He has been based in Washington to advise on program policy issues in fragile states, in Geneva, for the humanitarian branch of the WHO and in Brussels as advisor to European Commissioner Emma Bonino for her 1997 – 1998 campaign “a flower for the women of Kabul”. Kees Rietveld is father of teen-age twins. He is a cyclist, runner, reader, and enjoys playing the violin.