by Daniel C. Kurtzer
On March 24, 2025, Vice President J.D. Vance posted the following comment on X: “Turns out a lot of diplomacy boils down to a simple skill: don’t be an idiot.” In a recent article, Aaron David Miller and I graded the diplomacy of President Trump’s envoys, Steven Witkoff and Jared Kushner, and assigned them a grade of ‘F’.1 The two Trump-appointed envoys are not idiots, but they deserved the failing grade. The question, therefore, is what are the skills needed in diplomacy that Mr. Vance ought to value and that Witkoff and Kushner ought to demonstrate?
Since retiring from the Foreign Service and during twenty years on the Princeton faculty, I have devoted much of my research to studying the lessons that can be learned from American diplomacy in the Middle East.2 I call it ‘looking in the mirror’. I argue that we need to eschew the tendency to blame the other party in a bilateral negotiation, or one or both parties in a negotiation in which we play the role of mediator, and instead study our own behavior. Whether we then apply those lessons learned is worth a separate study—spoiler alert: we normally do not. In the interest of studying lessons learned, even if not applied today,3 an excellent place to start is the diplomacy leading to the 1991 Madrid peace conference.
Preliminary Steps: The Presidential Mandate
In a speech to Congress in early March 1991, after Iraq had been pushed out of Kuwait, President George H.W. Bush said that one of his post-war priorities would be to try to advance the prospects of Israeli-Arab peace.4 He dispatched Secretary of State James A. Baker III to the region to focus US diplomatic attention on this conflict.
Baker assessed that none of the parties was ready to seek a conflict-ending agreement, as they all carried too much historical and emotional baggage, and none of the substantive issues had been discussed in detail previously. Rather, he sought to break the procedural taboos that the parties had constructed to negotiations, specifically, the link between the Arab preference for an international conference and the Israeli preference for direct talks; and the question of Palestinian representation, since Israel refused to sit with the Palestine Liberation Organization. Toward this end, he traveled to the region eight times to engage with the parties between March and October 1991.
Overcoming Objections
By June, Baker thought he had put enough on the table to propose convening a peace conference leading to direct negotiations. He addressed letters to all the prospective invitees: Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and the Palestinians from the occupied territories with whom he had been meeting. To the dismay of Baker’s “peace team” —in which I participated as a deputy assistant secretary of state — both Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad said no, that they were not ready to participate in the peace process that Baker was constructing. Baker, however, was not dismayed. He gathered us together and said we were not accepting “no” as an answer. Rather, he invited Shamir and Assad – and the other parties as well —to share their concerns and questions with us; and he asked the peace team to answer every question and to address every concern. Countless exchanges with the parties occupied our time that summer, as we responded to every question, which Shamir and Assad often repeated verbatim in the hope of eliciting a different response.
While engaged in these exchanges, we observed a most interesting phenomenon in Syria. Assad traveled throughout the country meeting with and addressing various audiences and constituencies—the “heroic youth” of the revolution, the Baath party faithful, and the like. We realized he was doing politics the Syrian way. Syria was far from being a democracy in which Assad would be answerable to the people, but he nonetheless felt compelled to explain his thinking, which also allowed him to gauge the public reaction to a possible opening of formal contacts with Israel at a peace conference. We learned an important lesson about the role of domestic politics in decision making, even in authoritarian societies.
To address some of the parties’ concerns, Baker offered each of them a letter of assurances about US policy and the peace process if that would help them say yes. These kinds of assurances or guarantees were employed in earlier phases of Middle East diplomacy. However, Baker introduced three unique guiding principles that would inform each letter: nothing in any letter would contradict the agreed terms of reference for the conference and the ensuing negotiations; nothing would change US policy; and the letter to one party would not be kept secret from the other parties. This proved to be a lesson in transparency that helped build trust in Baker as the negotiator.
That summer passed like a whirlwind, and by September we sensed the parties were nearing a decision. Then, Shamir introduced a new twist: he requested $10 billion in loan guarantees to help resettle Jewish immigrants from the Soviet Union in Israel. The administration had helped achieve the breakthrough that allowed Jews to emigrate, and thus the idea of helping them get settled in Israel was appealing. However, not wanting the loan guarantees to undercut a principal element of Bush’s policy, the administration conditioned its agreement on Israel’s not resettling the immigrants in the occupied territories. Shamir refused to accept the condition, tried to end-run the president directly to Congress, but lost when Congress sided with Bush. The lesson here: without the president’s determination and backbone, side issues can derail even a successful negotiation.
Knowing When to Push
On October 18, in Jerusalem, Baker assessed that we were close, but he hesitated initially to announce success, because no party had given an unconditional “yes” to the terms of reference for the conference or the bilateral and multilateral negotiations that were to follow the conference. In one of the most consequential meetings of my career, I took the lead in convincing Baker to proceed, arguing that the United States needed to provide the bridge between the positions of the parties that they could not do themselves. Baker changed his mind, and later that afternoon, alongside then-Soviet Foreign Minister Boris Pankin, Baker announced that a peace conference leading to direct negotiations would convene in Madrid less than two weeks later. To be sure, none of the conference procedures had been agreed at all, such as the order and length of speeches, the shape of the table, or the other rules that normally bedevil those trying to arrange a conference. That would come later when Baker instructed us simply to inform the parties of these procedures and to brook no pushbacks. Baker’s decision not to negotiate the logistical details could have delayed or even derailed the conference. He had read correctly the degree to which American diplomatic power was dominant at the time.
The peace conference convened in Madrid on October 30, 1991, with US President George H. W. Bush and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev delivering opening remarks. Israel, Syria, Lebanon, a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, Egypt, Saudi Arabia on behalf of the six Gulf Cooperation Council countries, Tunisia on behalf of the Arab Maghreb Union, and representatives of the European Union and the United Nations were in attendance. Following the formal opening, bilateral talks started between Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, and Israel and the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Multilateral talks on arms control and regional security, economic development, refugees, water, and environment were launched at a formal conference in Moscow in January 1992. The Bush/Baker diplomacy had achieved a breakthrough in Arab-Israeli diplomacy.
President Bush addressing the Madrid Conference. (Photo by David Valdez, US National Archives and Records Administration. Public Domain.)
This well-documented episode in US diplomacy is pregnant with additional lessons for dealing with protracted conflicts, as well as the strategy, tactics, and tools for resolving seemingly insurmountable problems.5 These lessons carry as much weight for current efforts to secure peace in the Middle East as they did nearly fifty years ago.
Define the National Interest and Situate it within other Priorities
Bush’s speech to Congress clearly stated his goals and the importance he attached to advancing Arab-Israeli peace. Anticipating victory, the president asked us during the run-up to war to develop plans for four possible post-war initiatives: promoting democracy in the region, advancing equitable economic development, creating the architecture for Gulf security, and promoting Arab-Israeli relations. US diplomats thus had a clear idea of what to do after the war and knew that the president was committed to the goals he had set out publicly.
Understand the Impact of the International and Regional Environment on Diplomacy
US diplomacy in 1991 benefited from almost perfect conditions. The Soviet Union was about to implode, removing it from the Cold War rivalry that had dominated international relations after World War II. Yet rather than pursuing a unilateralist policy, Bush invited the Soviet Union to be a co-sponsor of the process. To be sure, Soviet diplomats did little in the run-up to the Madrid conference. But their role as a co-sponsor was critical in bringing their former client states on board.
The regional context was also exceptionally supportive of American diplomacy. US envoys created three multinational coalitions following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait: a political coalition that resulted in twelve UN Security Council resolutions that bound Iraq’s hands and provided legitimacy for military action; a military coalition that included not only expected Western partners but three key Arab states–Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia–willing to fight against another Arab state; and a financial coalition that collected substantial funding from countries who did not or could not provide troops, what we jokingly called the “tin cup” exercise.
The local context also proved to be important. In late 1987, West Bank/Gaza Palestinians had launched the first Intifada, challenging the decision-making authority of the PLO, which was based in Tunis. When PLO leader Yasser Arafat threw the PLO’s support behind Iraq, this provided an opening for US diplomacy to get to Madrid without the PLO, whose presence would have prompted Israel to decide not to participate.
Define the Objectives and Try to Ensure They are Achievable
In the war against Iraq, President Bush made clear the goal was to liberate Kuwait, which the Security Council had authorized. He rejected the entreaties of those who argued to pursue the war and unseat Saddam Hussein. Similarly, in getting to Madrid, the goal was to break the taboos that had stood in the way of Arab-Israel negotiations and to launch direct talks. Bush and Baker understood it would be impossible to push too hard too soon to tackle the substantive issues dividing the parties.
Indeed, had Bush and Baker tried for a conflict ending outcome in 1991, it likely would not have gotten off the ground. Decades of conflict and mutually exclusive narratives were challenges too daunting to overcome at the time. Baker understood that Madrid’s procedural breakthroughs were not going to be enough to resolve the conflict, but they were a necessary starting point. On the way home after the Madrid Conference, however, Baker gathered us together on the plane and said that he would soon return to the White House to help Bush’s re-election campaign, but that he would return to the State Department if Bush won, and we would be signing peace treaties between Israel and its neighbors soon after. Even we hardened and often cynical members of his peace team believed him, as we thought we had unlocked the door leading to peace agreements.
Choose the Negotiator and the Team Wisely
The Bush-Baker relationship proved essential in achieving this and many other diplomatic achievements. They were close, long-time friends and political allies. When Baker walked into a room, his interlocutors knew he spoke for the president. It is hard to think of another president and secretary of state who enjoyed this kind of relationship.
Baker also assembled a team of advisors well-versed in Middle East history and diplomacy, a sine qua non in any conflict where the parties are steeped in the history and details of the conflict and thus believe they can run circles around uninformed American negotiators. Even though we constituted a team, there was almost never a consensus among us on strategy and tactics. Knock-down-drag-out disputes characterized our meetings, as we developed papers for Secretary Baker.
Baker was not only a consummate negotiator, he was also curious and a voracious consumer of information and analysis about the conflict and the parties. He asked for a constant stream of memos that explained the issues in detail. While he never pretended to be the expert on the subjects under discussion, he came to know enough to hold his own in every discussion with Arabs and Israelis. The conflict interested him to the point that he told one member of the team that when he came back in the next life, he wanted to be a peace processor.
Implications Today
US negotiators today enjoy a close relationship with President Trump—like Baker with Bush—and that is a major advantage. But, unlike a secretary of state who can focus on a particular conflict knowing that trusted others are continuing engagement in other conflicts, Trump’s envoys are over-extended. They are trying to do three conflicts themselves—Gaza, Iran, and Russia/Ukraine, and they are doing it with few support staff deeply steeped in the history, narratives, and nuances of the conflicts. They have also said that they are uninterested in history, since previous efforts to resolve these conflicts had failed. That, of course, is exactly why they should be studying history and learning the lessons that need to be integrated into their effort.
The negotiators today have also been asked to engage without the president having articulated clear goals on any of the three issues in which the envoys are engaged: Does the president want the negotiators to press Ukraine to give up territory, or is he looking for a different outcome? Was the president serious about reaching a nuclear agreement with Iran, or were the negotiations part of a deception strategy before the war? Were the twenty-one hours of negotiations led by Vice President Vance after a ceasefire was agreed in the war against Iran sufficient to conclude that an agreement was not possible, or was that effort fated to fail if Iran did not accede to US demands? How serious is the president about moving to stage two of his 20-point Gaza plan, and what is he prepared to do to get there?
Even with the most determined president, adept negotiators, the clearest goals, the best strategy, and the most intelligent tactics and tools, an agreement is not assured. But without them, failure is.
Notes
1. Daniel C. Kurtzer and Aaron David Miller, “Witkoff and Kushner Get an F in Diplomacy,” Foreign Policy, March 3, 2026.
2. For example, Daniel Kurtzer and Scott Lasensky, Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East (United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008), and Daniel Kurtzer, et. al., The Peace Puzzle: America’s Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace, 1989-2011 (Cornell University Press, 2013).
3. See Daniel Kurtzer, ed., Pathways to Peace: America and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).
4. “…[We] we must work to create new opportunities for peace and stability in the Middle East…The time has come to put an end to Arab-Israeli conflict.” https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/march-6-1991-address-joint-session-congress-end-gulf-war
5. See James A. Baker III, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989-1992 (Putnam, 1995).
Daniel C. Kurtzer is a lecturer and the S. Daniel Abraham professor of Middle East Policy Studies at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. During a 29-year career in the US Foreign Service, Ambassador (ret.) Kurtzer served as the United States ambassador to Israel and as the United States ambassador to Egypt. He is the co-author of Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace: American Leadership in the Middle East (2008) and the forthcoming The Peace Puzzle: America’s Quest for Arab-Israeli Peace.