by Mohamed Elbaikam
For more than three decades, the United Nations has managed the Western Sahara dispute without reaching a final political settlement. Since the 1991 ceasefire and the establishment of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) under Security Council Resolution 690 (1991), the UN framework has formally centered on the principle of self-determination. Implementation, however, has remained stalled due to persistent disagreements over sequencing, modalities, and the scope of a political solution.
Two periods in this protracted diplomatic process merit particular attention: the tenure of James A. Baker III (1997–2004) and Christopher Ross (2009–2017) as personal envoys of the UN secretary-general. Their experiences illuminate the structural constraints that continue to define the file.
James Baker: Structured Political Sequencing
Baker’s efforts culminated in the 2003 “Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara” (UN document S/2003/565). The plan proposed a transitional autonomy arrangement followed by a referendum including multiple options, among them independence. Security Council Resolution 1495 (2003) expressed support for the plan as an “optimum political solution.”
Although the plan ultimately did not secure full acceptance by all parties, it represented one of the most detailed attempts to operationalize the principle of self-determination within a structured political framework.
Years after his service, Baker publicly reflected on shifts in US policy. Writing in The Washington Post in December 2020, he described the US recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara as:
“…an astounding retreat from the principles of international law and diplomacy that the United States has espoused and respected for many years…. This rash move disguised as diplomacy will contribute to the existing deadlock in resolving the long-standing conflict between Morocco and the people of Western Sahara.”
That assessment, from a former secretary of state who personally attempted to broker a negotiated settlement, underscores the importance of coherence between diplomatic action and established legal frameworks.
Christopher Ross: Field Engagement and Political Inclusion
Christopher Ross’s tenure unfolded in a period marked by regional upheaval and evolving security dynamics across North Africa and the Sahel. UN reporting during his mandate documented multiple visits to the territory and consultations with stakeholders beyond official delegations, including representatives of civil society and human rights advocates.
The author was among the Sahrawi civil society actors who met with Ross during one of his visits, reflecting the envoy’s willingness to engage directly with local voices. This field-oriented engagement distinguished his approach from strictly capital-based shuttle diplomacy and aimed to ground negotiations in political and social realities inside the territory.
Christopher Ross (center) meeting with Sahrawi civil society activists in Nouakchott. Photo credit: Mohamed Elbaikam
In a subsequent analysis published by Dialogue Initiatives, Ross characterized certain Security Council developments as:
“…a step backward despite the claims of its supporters…. Too often, analysts assert that it is up to Algeria and Morocco alone to find a solution over the heads of the people of Western Sahara. This should not and cannot happen.”
His emphasis on the centrality of the Sahrawi people in any negotiated outcome aligns with the repeated language of Security Council resolutions linking a settlement to self-determination.
International and European Legal Parameters
The International Court of Justice, in its 1975 advisory opinion, concluded that historical ties between Morocco and the territory did not amount to sovereignty and did not negate the application of self-determination.
In recent years, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has issued a series of rulings concerning EU–Morocco association, fisheries, and trade agreements. The Court affirmed that Western Sahara constitutes a “separate and distinct territory” from Morocco and that such agreements cannot apply to the territory without the consent of its people. These rulings emerged in the context of legal challenges linked to representation of Sahrawi interests before European courts and have added a significant judicial dimension to the dispute’s international profile.
Within the United Nations system, Western Sahara remains listed as a Non-Self-Governing Territory.
Security Context and Regional Stability
Public reporting from the United Nations and the US Department of State does not designate the Polisario Front as a terrorist organization, nor do annual Country Reports on Terrorism identify Sahrawi political structures as a source of transnational terrorism or organized criminal networks. UN documentation has focused primarily on ceasefire monitoring, humanitarian conditions, and political negotiations rather than counterterrorism containment.
Unlike some liberation movements that became embedded in broader proxy rivalries or ideological alignments, the Polisario Front has continued to frame its diplomatic engagement around implementation of self-determination within UN parameters. The Sahrawi leadership has maintained openness toward engagement with a range of international actors, including the United States, without redefining the conflict through external geopolitical blocs.
In a region increasingly shaped by migration pressures, counterterrorism partnerships, and great power competition, the absence of documented large-scale involvement of Sahrawi political actors in transnational destabilizing activities remains a relevant contextual factor for policymakers.
Diplomatic Lessons for the United States
The record of Baker and Ross suggests that Western Sahara is not undefined in legal terms; rather, it remains politically unresolved. Mandate renewals and stability management can prevent escalation, but durable settlement requires alignment between legal principles, diplomatic sequencing, and political feasibility.
For the United States, the Western Sahara file continues to present a test of balancing strategic partnerships, regional stability, and long-standing commitments to self-determination within the UN framework. The experience of past American envoys indicates that progress depends less on rhetorical repositioning than on sustained coherence between law, diplomacy, and structured political engagement.
Mohamed Elbaikam is an independent Sahrawi activist from Western Sahara. He previously worked with Sahrawi associations dedicated to human rights and the monitoring of natural resources. He now writes extensively on Western Sahara, with articles published in multiple languages in newspapers and media outlets around the world.