by Raymond F. Smith
I arrived in Moscow in late August 1988 to begin a three-year assignment heading the US embassy’s political section. I had learned during my pre-departure consultations in Washington that there were still diametrically opposing views among policy-makers and within the intelligence community about whether the reform program that Mikhail Gorbachev had begun was meaningful. The negative view held that the reforms were intended merely to make the Soviet system operate more efficiently and that, if successful, the US would be faced with an equally hostile, but even more dangerous adversary. One of my key objectives was for the embassy’s political reporting to have meaningful impact on this debate.
Several weeks later, on a pleasant Saturday afternoon, my wife and I decided to take a walk in Moscow’s downtown area. As we strolled along Gorky street in the direction of the Garden Ring Road, which encompassed the city’s historic, older section, I noticed a group of people, perhaps a couple dozen, gathered on a corner where the two streets intersected. Their attention was drawn to what I realized as I drew closer was a demonstration by a small group of human rights activists. Surprisingly, although there was a substantial police and security service presence, the demonstration was proceeding unhindered. This was not the first such demonstration in this location, but it was the first time the demonstrators had not been immediately engulfed by security personnel, bundled into waiting vehicles, and hauled away.
Curious about the reactions of those watching, I joined the group. A uniformed policeman, in the street in front of the group, was telling them to move along, that there was nothing here they needed to concern themselves with. At first, no one spoke, but no one moved. Then, a man spoke up, saying in effect: I’m a Soviet citizen. Why can’t I stand wherever I want on a sidewalk in Moscow. Murmurs of agreement met his assertion. The visibly frustrated policeman, who was obviously under orders not to initiate an incident, himself drifted away.
I have found it useful to distinguish between events that are noteworthy and those that are significant. A noteworthy event in a country will be widely reported by the foreign press, but it may or may not actually be significant within the country. A significant event will have an impact within the country, but may go unnoticed abroad. I knew that members of the Western press in Moscow were observing this human rights demonstration and that it would be widely reported because the authorities had allowed it to occur. The more significant event, in my view, was the fact that a group of apparently average Soviet citizens had asserted a right that a representative of the state authority structure was telling them they did not have…and had done it successfully. The Soviet system had told them for 70 years that they had rights, but only the rights the state allowed.
Within two years, hundreds of thousands of Muscovites took part in demonstrations supporting reform. Hundreds of thousands in some Soviet republics demonstrated in support of independence. And three years later, several thousand Muscovites put their lives on the line to successfully resist a coup by leaders who wanted to restore the old Soviet system.
Since World War II, the United States has created a highly competent cadre of analysts in the intelligence community, supplemented and often cross-fertilized by academic and think tank experts. But culturally and linguistically trained embassy personnel can bring something to the analytical table that no Washington-based expert can—the first-hand knowledge that comes from living in a country and the concomitant ability to distinguish the noteworthy from the significant. This kind of analysis can enrich and inform the decision-making of policy-makers, but only if it is supported and encouraged, even when it diverges from the Washington consensus.
Raymond Smith spent more than 30 years at the State Department, retiring from the Senior Foreign Service as a Minister Counselor and then serving as a senior advisor to the Department’s Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund. He spent six years at the US embassy in Moscow, serving as political counselor from 1988-91, a period that included stints as Acting Deputy Chief of Mission and Chargé d’Affaires. He has a doctorate in international relations from Northwestern University and has authored two books, Negotiating with the Soviets and The Craft of Political Analysis for Diplomats, as well as numerous articles.