by Keith McCormick
The DACOR Bacon House Foundation’s 2025 Annual Conference, held on September 12, focused on Iran. The conference brought together academics, former diplomats, and policy activists to analyze the new situation facing Iran in the Middle East after a string of military setbacks, and the prospects for diplomacy with the United States. A list of participants is appended to this article.

A Policy Shift to Defensive Nationalism
A key theme that emerged was Iran’s shift from aggressive ideology to defensive nationalism. All the speakers agreed that Iran is in a difficult position. It lost its only real ally in the region when in early December 2024 the Assad regime in Syria collapsed. Its most important proxies—Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis—have been decimated by Israeli attacks. Iran’s so-called Forward Strategy, keystone of the mullahs’ foreign policy for decades, lies in ruins.
Israeli and US bombing also exposed the vulnerability of Iran itself. US bombing did not “obliterate” Iran’s nuclear program, and Israel’s assassinations, while causing the mullahs to crack down even harder on internal dissent, did not succeed in decapitating the regime. The US bombing even led to an upsurge in Iranian nationalism among those normally critical of the clerical regime. But the destruction of Iran’s air defense system accomplished a key Israeli goal: to keep Iran as vulnerable to bombing as other Israeli neighbors and to make rebuilding its military much more difficult.

Iran’s Strategic Choices Are Limited
As a Shi’a Persian island in a Sunni Arab sea, it has always seen its greatest threat as coming from the Arabs—so much so that it once saw Israel as a natural ally. After the painful experience of the Iran-Iraq War, in which the United States supported Baghdad, Iran concluded that its western borders were indefensible. The mullahs came up with the strategy of Forward Defense to keep what they regarded as inevitable future fighting as far west and as far away from Iran as possible. With that strategy now in ruins, and Israel determined to create a “Greater Israel” hostile to Tehran, the mullahs are increasingly turning from exporting revolution to defending the nation. Their sense of beleaguered isolation deepened when Russia and China failed to defend Iran against Israeli and US attacks after October 7. Many of the speakers felt the chances were high that another round of fighting might break out between Israel and Iran.
While Human Rights Abuse Continues, the Regime Is Not about to Collapse
The mullahs know their regime is unpopular, corrupt, and inefficient. They want to avoid the kind of “Gulag” approach the Soviet Union used, in which even loyal officials feared for their lives, and corruption is rarely punished. Within the ruling elite, a limited debate on strategy is even possible, with public articles asking “Who Lost Syria?” or weighing the pros and cons of engaging with the West.
For the rest of the population, however, censorship, oppression, and human rights abuse continue. Executions have increased. Surveillance technology from China has helped the police identify and punish people trying to use the internet or listen to Western media. Despite widespread support, the regime was able to outmaneuver and contain the most recent women’s revolt, the so-called “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement beginning in September 2022 against compulsory dress, though it was careful to base its tactics on an appeal to law and order rather than religion.
Sanctions Have Failed to Modify Iranian Behavior
There was a clear consensus among the conferees that Iran is still able to fund proxies, export oil, and build a military machine. In fact, the burden of economic sanctions tends to fall primarily on the ordinary population rather than on leaders. A more effective approach would be to target sanctions narrowly to individual officials, who value their careers and privileges far more than their religious rhetoric might suggest.
Experts from a wide variety of disciplines and backgrounds all agreed that regime change is unlikely to come from without; only a split within the ruling elite could bring the mullahs down. At present, there is little sign of an Iranian Gorbachev. A wild card, however, could be the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. A wily political survivor who has shrewdly balanced competing factions in the governing coalition, he has ruled Iran since 1989 and is 86 years old, the longest-serving head of state in the Middle East.
Chances for an Early Breakthrough in Diplomacy Are Low
While the prospects for détente looked high in April, when the US opened talks about a nuclear agreement, speaker after speaker said they now seemed bleak. The US bombing hardened Iranian attitudes and made them more suspicious that the US uses negotiations to mask surprise attacks. Iran is also well aware that the Trump administration is distracted and dysfunctional, with key experts fired or sidelined.
Any thaw in US relations with Iran would endanger Israel’s long-term goal of involving the US in direct conflict with Iran. Israel’s bombing of Iran just prior to the April talks may have been intended to disrupt US-Iranian dialogue. A détente would also be opposed by many in the US government; several participants found it suspicious that the initial US position that Iran forego any nuclear weapons was suddenly expanded to include a demand that it cease any kind of enrichment entirely (which effectively doomed the talks). Some speakers argued that it might be better to wait for a more propitious moment, since an initiative now might fail and discredit diplomacy. Rather than a bilateral deal or simply maintaining the current system of musical chairs as countries shift short-term alliances for fear of being odd man out, perhaps US diplomacy should focus on a comprehensive framework of security for the entire region.
The Biggest Problems Facing Iran May Not Be Military or Economic, but Environmental and Demographic Trends
Water is now so short that even the capital city cannot meet demand. (Shortly after the conference, Iran announced that water shortages mean it will soon be forced to move the capital to another part of the country.) While some of this may be due to climate change, much of it is because the country tries to grow all its own food as part of its ideology of radical military self-sufficiency. The shortage of water has also contributed to an energy crisis so severe that crucial industries have had to be shut down.

Demographic trends are equally sobering. Iran is a youthful, urban country, and the younger population is increasingly alienated and secular. Thousands of mosques stand empty across the country. While the mullahs’ focus is on preparing Iran for an attack from foreign enemies, the conference concluded that they may face an even greater threat from these trends.
Mutual Misunderstanding Is Enormous
Washington sees Iran through the prism of the relatively few issues the US cares about—nuclear weapons, terrorism, Israel—and has little understanding of Tehran’s priorities. The mullahs, highly intelligent as they are, are even more clueless about the West. With no diplomatic relations, no free journalism, and few opportunities for dialogue or travel, the US and Iranian leaderships talk past each other and frequently misunderstand each other’s interests and intentions.
Conference Participants
Mr. Alan Eyre, Distinguished Diplomatic Fellow, Middle East Institute
Dr. Patricia Karam, Senior Policy Advisor on Iran, Freedom House
Amb. Barbara Leaf, Senior International Policy Advisor, Arnold & Porter, Former Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State
Dr. Vali Nasr, Majid Kkhadduri Professor of International Affairs and Middle East Studies, John Hopkins University, SAIS, and author, Iran’s Grand Strategy (keynote)
Dr. Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President, Quincy Institute
Ms. Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow, Middle East & North Africa, Stimson Center
Mr. Alex Vatanka, Senior Fellow, Middle East Institute
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Keith McCormick is a retired FSO and one of the organizers of the annual DACOR Conference
