by Keith McCormick and Audrey Straw
This article provides the highlights of the discussions at this year’s DACOR (Diplomatic and Consular Officers Retired) conference on how the US should deal with a rising India. The participants—academics, retired diplomats, and current government officials—participated on the basis of no attribution. The three panels discussed whether India can be a new strategic partner for the US in containing China; how the US. should respond to the Modi government’s increasing use of Hindu chauvinism to undermine democracy and tolerance; and what is ahead for India’s economy, including whether it will become the leader of the Global South in challenging the current, Western-dominated international trading order.
Can India Be a Strategic Partner?
Speakers warned that the US should not overestimate India’s interest in becoming a strategic partner. India’s refusal to condemn the Russian attack on Ukraine enrages Washington, but New Delhi has a long history of ties to Russia and remembers the years of US support for its next-door enemy, Pakistan. Modern India is prickly, fiercely independent, and determined to maintain an equal distance from Russia, China, and the United States.
For this very reason, however, India has quietly begun to reduce its dependence on Russian military parts and weapons by sourcing much of its current military buildup to American arms exporters and has begun to hold joint training exercises with US troops. This buildup, which includes a new emphasis on naval power, is aimed at projecting influence throughout the Indian Ocean rather than confronting Pakistan in yet another war. Indeed, the conference heard that planners in New Delhi have concluded they have more to fear from a failed state in Pakistan than from a strong one. Speakers with a diplomatic background noted that India is seen as a “regional bully” by some neighbors, and recently lost its closest ally when the dictatorship in Bangladesh collapsed.
While India increased its oil purchases from Russia following US sanctions aimed at blocking them, its relations with China have become more wary. It is concerned by the possibility that China might demonstrate the same aggressiveness in the Indian Ocean that it does in the South China Sea. In response to questions, speakers made clear that the Quad agreement is not a military alliance, and India has no intention of committing to one. But it could yet be interested in becoming a bulwark against Chinese expansion in the Indo-Pacific area. According to several speakers, India is confident the West is “courting” it. They urged the US to avoid assuming anything, not take India for granted, and explore small, concrete opportunities one at a time.
Democracy and Human Rights
The conference heard strong warnings about the Modi government’s increasingly authoritarian drift. NGOs have growing human rights concerns, and some have had their assets frozen or employees threatened. The 2024 elections were a sharp rebuke to the ruling Bharatiya Janata (BJP) party and its close relations with the secretive, ultra-right-wing, Hindu nationalist paramilitary organization Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). Yet the BJP is unlikely to lose power before elections are required again in 2027. It may continue undermining democracy, limiting dissent, and tolerating or encouraging Hindu violence against Muslims, Christians, and other minorities. Paranoid about ‘encirclement,’ the BJP seems determined to make India a place for Hindus rather than the diverse, secular republic envisioned by Gandhi. It has also been accused by the US and Canadian governments of planning assassinations of Sikh dissidents in Vancouver and New York (accusations which became public shortly after the conference). The US needs to speak out clearly against this even as it courts New Delhi in other areas.
Economy, Trade, and the Global South
All nine speakers agreed that India has become, and is likely to remain, an economic powerhouse. Bilateral trade and investment have soared since India abandoned socialism and opened its borders to international trade. While many US investors find dealing with the Indian bureaucracy too frustrating, others have found huge new markets and profits. Some see an opportunity to “de-risk” from China by moving production to India. India’s rapid economic and population growth have created huge problems of inequality and pollution, but optimists among the speakers saw a chance for the US to encourage India to pursue a greener economy and profit by it. Pessimists identified structural weaknesses, including an excessive concentration of power in New Delhi and the states that leaves most Indian cities with almost none of the authority or capability their US counterparts enjoy to deal with pressing issues of practical governance.
India sees itself as a leader of the Global South in challenging Western-dominated international norms in trade and many other areas. Several speakers questioned how successful it would be in this attempt. Even if one assumes that China is not part of it, the Global South is far from a unified bloc and contains many other middle-rank powers that have no intention of accepting India as their spokesman. There was a broad consensus that any new international trading order that might emerge in coming years would have to include a larger role for India, but no agreement over whether India would use this power to promote specific national interests, as it often has in the past, or a broader and more fundamental change to benefit the entire South.
Conclusion
Speakers coming from political, economic, human rights, and other perspectives all endorsed the comment of one expert that the US relationship with India is “complex, high maintenance, and valuable.” Our agendas often differ: we want to talk about freedom of the seas; New Delhi wants to talk about exclusive economic ocean zones. There is a backlog of mutual disappointments and suspicions. India is not an easy country to deal with. Yet, unlike China, India prefers to use existing international institutions rather than replace them. It remains a democracy, if an increasingly illiberal one. If America cannot afford to let any one country dominate Asia, it may yet decide that India is an essential bulwark against Chinese attempts to do so.
Keith McCormick is the outgoing chair of the program committee at DACOR. He retired from the Foreign Service after a 40-year career at the State Department, with postings in Europe, Africa, and Asia and secondments to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the NSC.
Audrey Straw is the program assistant at DACOR. She is studying International Development Studies at George Washington University, where she will graduate with her masters in May 2025.
Conference Participants (in alphabetical order): Dr. Waris Husain, Legal Advisor, South and Southeast Asia, American Bar Association, Justice Defenders Program, Adjunct Professor of International Law, Howard University Law School; Nancy Izzo Jackson, Deputy Assistant Secretary for India, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, US Department of State (Keynote Speaker); Michael Kugelman, Director, South Asia Institute, Wilson Center; Mark Linscott, Senior Advisor, The Asia Group; Nonresident Senior Fellow, South Asia Center, Atlantic Council; Dr. Daniel Markey, Senior Advisor, South Asia Programs, United States Institute of Peace; Richard Rossow, Senior Advisor and Chair in US-India Policy Studies, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Ambassador Teresita Schaffer (ret.), Senior Advisor, McLarty Associates; Sarang Shidore, Director, Global South Program, Quincy Institute; Vikram J. Singh, Senior Advisor, Asia Center, United States Institute of Peace.