by Hans Binnendijk
Despite multiple crises over its 75-year history, NATO remains the world’s most successful alliance. It has achieved success by continually adapting to changing threats and global conditions. What many see as a weakness – decision making by consensus – has proven to be NATO’s strength. With every member holding a veto, extreme care must be taken to achieve agreed outcomes. This often takes time and an incremental approach. Strong American leadership has been required to avoid excessive delays and least common denominator outcomes.
As contentious issues built up over the decades, the alliance has used small leadership groups, 34 summits, countless foreign and defense ministers’ meetings, eight strategic concepts and several special reports to adapt its policies and retain its unity.
NATO is now in what might be seen as the fifth phase of its 75-year history. The first two phases were during the Cold War. The third phase was the immediate post-Cold War decade. The fourth concentrated on international terrorism. Today the focus is back on major power competition. NATO’s strategic adaptation since 2014 has continued to be incremental from summit to summit, but the cumulative impact is profound.
Managing Early Crises (Phase One)
From its founding in 1949 until 1967, NATO relied almost exclusively on American military power. Under the Eisenhower administration’s New Look, massive nuclear retaliation deterred Soviet adventurism. The Korean and Vietnam Wars diverted American attention towards Asia and reminded allies of America’s global responsibilities. Greece, Turkey, and West Germany became NATO members in the alliance’s first enlargements. The 1956 Suez Crisis underlined for allies the importance of consulting with Washington before taking military action. The 1961 Berlin Crisis reminded Europe of both American dominance and the risk of wider war. The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis further reminded the allies that they were highly vulnerable to the consequences of decisions made in Washington. NATO survived these crises and American wars in part because Europe was so dependent on America’s military strength.
The Kennedy administration’s shift away from massive retaliation to flexible response created NATO’s first existential challenge. President John Kennedy concluded that a massive nuclear strike in response to any Soviet conventional military attack was not credible. So, the United States focused more on conventional and tactical nuclear responses to a Soviet military challenge. Many in Europe saw this as an American willingness to fight a major war on European soil in lieu of a focus on strategic nuclear deterrence. France’s Charles de Gaulle responded by kicking NATO out of its Paris headquarters and removing France from NATO’s military command structure.
The Dual Track Approach (Phase Two)
NATO adapted with the 1967 Harmel Report, which redefined NATO’s mission as including both enhancing military deterrence and pursuing detente with the Soviet Union. This dual track strategy achieved a new balance and was the cornerstone of Phase Two of NATO’s Cold War history (1967 to 1989). In the 1970s, US troop strength in Europe topped 300,000, and some 7,000 tactical nuclear weapons were deployed. Progress was made on the second track as well as in major nuclear and conventional arms control negotiations.
The dual track approach was severely tested in 1976 when the Soviets began deploying SS-20 intermediate range (INF) nuclear tipped missiles aimed at Europe. German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt believed that unless the United States responded by deploying its own INF systems on the continent, European security would be decoupled from America’s deterrent force. He convinced Washington. This triggered the INF deployment crisis and massive public protests throughout Europe.
The dual track formula embedded in the Harmel Report became the basis for restored alliance unity. The INF dual track decision was agreed at a 1979 foreign and defense ministers’ meeting in Brussels. The United States would adapt by deploying Pershing ll and ground launched cruise missiles in Europe and then negotiating with Russia to eliminate all ground launched INF range missiles. It worked. The missiles were deployed and then removed as part of the 1987 INF Treaty. That alliance victory was the last major episode of the Cold War. It took NATO five summits in the 1980s to adjust to the changes of that decade.
A Unipolar Moment (Phase Three)
Phase Three of NATO’s history (1989 to 2001) was a unipolar moment with the US as the last superpower standing. The Berlin Wall fell on November 9, 1989, and the Soviet Union collapsed two years later. This created another existential crisis in the alliance. Was NATO still necessary? To adapt to this new world, NATO held summits in London (1990) and Rome (1991). NATO would continue to exist. It would reach out to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to maximize cooperation. It would seek a new relationship with Russia. This consensus was embedded in a new strategic concept at Rome.
The unipolar decade was dominated by three issues: war in the Balkans, NATO enlargement, and efforts to seek a new balance with Russia.
When Yugoslavia collapsed after Tito’s death, Serbia sought to maximize its dominance. NATO was slow to respond. Senator Richard Lugar declared in 1993 that for NATO, it was “out of (the treaty) area or out of business.” However, it took two years and Serbia’s massacre at Srebrenica to force NATO to adapt and create the Implementation Force (IFOR) which defeated Serbia in Bosnia. Then, in June of 1999, after Serbian ethnic cleansing, NATO created the Kosovo Force (KFOR) to drive Serbia out of Kosovo.
Building consensus on NATO enlargement to Central Europe also took several summit meetings. The process started slowly with the creation of the Partnership for Peace at the 1994 Brussels summit. Three years later at Madrid, invitations for membership were issued to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. It took two more years for their membership to be finalized at the 1999 Washington summit.
A complementary approach was designed to develop closer NATO ties with Russia. At the 1997 Paris Summit, the Founding Act between NATO and Russia was signed which created a Permanent Joint Council. That Council was subsequently upgraded in 2002, but mutual trust slowly collapsed.
The War on Terrorism (Phase Four)
Phase Four of NATO’s history began on September 11, 2001, when Al-Qaeda attacked the United States. The following day America’s 18 allies invoked NATO’s mutual defense clause (Article 5). This was NATO’s most rapid adaptation, and the only time Article 5 has been triggered. The shift was dramatic. NATO turned its attention to counterinsurgency and stability operations. For two decades NATO fought side by side with American forces in Afghanistan. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) became one of NATO’s longest and ultimately perhaps its least successful mission. At its height, ISAF included some 130,000 troops from 50 NATO and partner nations. Over 1,000 European soldiers lost their lives.
The 2003 American invasion of Iraq was initially shunned by most NATO countries, with only Britain and Poland playing a significant role. The Iraq War tested the unity of NATO, but by 2004 the alliance at the Istanbul summit had built enough consensus to create a NATO training mission there, which eventually trained some 15,000 Iraqi soldiers and police.
The change in mission and new technologies also led to a military transformation of the alliance’s capabilities. The 2002 Prague Summit created the NATO Response Force, a new capabilities commitment, and modifications in the NATO command structure.
Through this fourth phase, NATO continued to expand. At Istanbul in 2004, the so-called “big bang” enlargement admitted another seven countries, including the Baltic states. It was the 2008 Bucharest summit, however, that most upset the Kremlin. At Bucharest, NATO indicated that Ukraine and Georgia would eventually become members, without setting a timetable. This flawed compromise made both Georgia and Ukraine vulnerable without NATO protection. Russia eventually invaded both countries.
Back to Major Power Confrontation (Phase Five)
The slow transition to Phase Five of NATO history began at the 2007 Munich security conference when Russian President Vladimir Putin heavily criticized NATO policies. Putin invaded parts of Georgia in 2008. By 2010, NATO needed another adjustment. Under the guidance of former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, it designed yet another strategic concept. This one, adopted at the 2010 Lisbon summit, defined NATO’s tasks as threefold: collective defense, crisis management, and cooperative security. With some minor modifications contained in a subsequent 2022 strategic concept, these three tasks allow NATO the flexibility to address the major global challenges it now faces.
Early in 2014, Russia invaded and annexed Crimea and then sent ‘little green men” to seize parts of the Donbas. The transition to Phase Five and major power competition was complete. NATO held 15 summit meetings between 2008 and 2024 to adjust incrementally.
US-NATO relations under President Donald Trump were tumultuous, especially at the 2018 Brussels summit where he came close to withdrawing from the alliance. Cooperation returned under President Joseph Biden. Russia’s February 2022 full scale invasion of Ukraine shocked the alliance, but NATO has emerged with a new degree of unity.
NATO now faces at least five fundamental challenges that will require further adaptation. Each was addressed at the July 2024 NATO summit in Washington.
1. Winning the war in Ukraine.
NATO leaders met virtually on February 25, 2022, to unanimously condemn Russia’s invasion. In the ensuing two years, NATO countries provided over $150 billion in assistance to Ukraine, more than half coming from Europe. Military assistance has been coordinated by the US-led Ukraine Defense Contact Group. NATO’s consensus policy has been to provide Ukraine with what it needs to win short of starting World War lll. As a result, there have been pauses before new arms transfer thresholds. Europe has often been bolder than the United States in providing advanced weapons and in relaxing the restrictions on their use. This support has been enough for Ukraine to hold most of its defensive lines, but not enough for it to recoup all of its lost territory. The war is in stalemate for now.
The 2024 Washington summit took multiple steps to strengthen Ukraine’s security. NATO leaders declared that Ukraine’s path to NATO membership was “irreversible,” though there was no consensus for immediate membership. NATO pledged to continue military aid at current levels, to set up a NATO command in Wiesbaden to coordinate the aid, and to station a senior NATO liaison officer in Kyiv. And individual NATO nations like the US have negotiated bilateral defense support agreements with Kyiv.
2. Enhancing deterrence and defense of allied territory.
Russia’s invasion of a sovereign neighbor shook the alliance out of a stupor. At the 2016 Warsaw summit, NATO agreed to deploy battalion sized battle groups in vulnerable front line member states. Those deployments have expanded in size and scope and now eight NATO front line countries have such NATO battle groups, a few full time at the brigade level. NATO also adopted several initiatives related to readiness and mobility. Former non-aligned nations Finland and Sweden felt particularly vulnerable, and both are now NATO members, significantly strengthening NATO’s Nordic defenses. The 2022 Madrid summit adopted SACEUR’s New Force Model which creates regional defense plans, new national responsibilities for regional defense, and 300,000 response troops organized for tiered readiness.
The Washington summit built on this progress. A main focus was implementing SACEUR’s family of regional defense plans, including a dozen specific steps to enhance NATO’s defense posture. NATO leaders pledged to “constrain and contest” Russian aggression across multiple domains of conflict.
3. Moving from burden sharing to European strategic responsibility.
Inadequate European defense spending has been a constant problem. During the Cold War, Senators Mansfield and Nunn threatened to withdraw US troops if Europe did not contribute more. Former President Trump, in February 2024, raised the problem to a new level, saying he would encourage Russia to “do whatever the hell they want” to NATO nations who do not pay their defense “bills.” NATO sought to deal with this problem at the 2014 Wales summit by setting a goal for each ally to spend 2% of GDP on defense by 2024.
NATO was able to announce at the Washington summit that 23 of NATO’s 32 members will meet the 2% goal in 2024. Taken in the aggregate, European members are now spending 2% of their combined GDP on defense. Non-US NATO defense spending increased by 18% this past year. That is a good start, but much more will be needed to fully implement SACEUR’s new defense plans and for Europe to attain strategic responsibility. New output goals need to be set. Europe needs to acquire more so-called enablers such as strategic lift, air refueling, missile defense, space assets, and operational intelligence. And dramatic reform is needed to consolidate and streamline Europe’s defense industries.
4. Connecting European and Asian Security.
China’s aggressive behavior under Xi Jinping has fundamentally changed European attitudes towards China. Russia and China have a declared a “no limits” partnership.
European and Asian security are now inextricably linked. Should war break out between the US and China, Europe would be severely impacted economically and militarily. At the 2022 Madrid summit, NATO leaders for the first time directly addressed the challenges posed by China. The following year at the Vilnius summit they said, “the Peoples Republic of China’s stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values.”
At the 2024 Washington summit, NATO again invited leaders from Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand to attend. China was declared to be a “decisive enabler” of Russia’s war on Ukraine. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg declared that NATO nations could not have “normal relations” with China under these circumstances. European and Asian security were declared to be interconnected. A series of “flagship projects” were initiated between NATO and Asian partners, including greater defense industrial cooperation. Additional steps still need to be taken. Some NATO nations conduct naval exercises with the US and its Asian allies; this might now be done under a NATO flag. NATO liaison offices might be set up in Tokyo, Seoul and/or Canberra. China needs to understand that if it goes to war with the United States it could face a broad coalition of nations.
5. Keeping the United States engaged.
The November 2024 United States election could significantly impact NATO’s future. Should Kamala Harris be elected, she would presumably continue to stress the importance of America’s democratic alliances. Should Trump be elected, however, NATO could face a difficult future. Former senior Trump administration officials are convinced that Trump still views the alliance as obsolete and would seek to weaken Washington’s defense commitment to it. The United States Congress, acting on this concern, enacted legislation which prohibits a president from withdrawing from NATO unless Congress approves. But Trump could unilaterally withdraw American troops and senior officers from Europe and take other steps which would significantly weaken the Alliance.
Given Trump’s affinity for Putin and his opposition to aid to Ukraine, a Trump administration could deeply split NATO. The incremental steps taken at the Washington summit may not be enough to change his mind about the value of the alliance. The new NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte would need to respond with great dexterity to this challenge.
There are numerous other issues that NATO is managing, such as sustaining its counter-terrorism and counter-piracy efforts, meeting Iran’s complex challenges, dealing with cyber and other hybrid threats, countering disinformation, maximizing societal resilience, and dealing with global warming. All of this requires time to build consensus.
Conclusion
NATO has maintained a high degree of cohesion during its 75-year history by building consensus through adaptation and incremental steps. Summit meetings and strategic concepts have been key to this success. Occasionally in time of crisis, such as 9/11, NATO has been able to move very quickly. History shows that once NATO consensus is reached, the decisions tend to stick, and unity is maintained. That has been the case for NATO’s engagement in Ukraine.
NATO’s principal consensus builder, the United States, is now a wild card in this equation. Should Trump be re-elected, NATO’s future could be in danger. In that case, incremental adjustments may no longer be adequate to meet the challenge.
Hans Binnendijk is a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council. He previously served as NSC senior director for defense policy, acting director of the State Department’s Policy Planning staff, legislative director of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff, and vice president of the National Defense University.