by W. Robert Pearson
The Benefits of European Integration
The European Union has been an unprecedented success of diplomacy and cooperation. In the European mind, there has always been a dream to reconnect the broken parts left behind with the fall of the Roman Empire. For fifteen centuries, the tool for this project was warfare and political domination by one country or another. These measures failed in chaos and catastrophe. The last – the greatest conflict the world had ever seen – inspired Europeans to begin to rebuild the continent on an entirely different foundation. The European Union emerged and with it the NATO alliance, forming a link of transatlantic security that has held together with triumphs, divisions, and similar but separate interests for 75 years.
The EU has become a major moral voice globally. In environmental protection, health diplomacy, internet privacy protection, financial data protection, anti-trust actions,
the peaceful use of space, careful husbandry of marine resources and areas, and support for sustainable and resilient life for humans, among other commitments, Europe has offered outstanding leadership and contributions that are evident and admired.
The Challenge from the East
As a result of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 22, 2022, however, Europe faces an entire range of new challenges within NATO and within the EU. Europe’s geopolitical position has changed and will continue to evolve. There are questions about the new structure of the European economy itself as a result of the war. Questions arise about how Europe’s future will be affected by the United States, economically, politically, and militarily. With the stronger bonds between China and Russia, Europe is compelled also to consider Indo-Pacific security and its own economic relations with China.
If this were a chess game, Europe was forced in 2022 from its previously chosen positions to react to wholly new realities. Deciding on its own initiatives required first that it gain some stability in its geopolitical position. Twenty-two of NATO’s 32 members now will reach a 2% contribution to defense this year. Much of that money will go to fill in previous gaps in its military posture. No one predicts that 2% will be enough – 3% or even 4% may be demanded.
The political alignment in European countries, if it does in fact shift far enough to the right to replace the current centralist leadership, could see a rise in sentiment to settle the war in Ukraine at Ukraine’s expense. One of the reasons many Europeans have pressed for a clear path to Ukraine’s NATO membership is that with Ukraine in NATO, the US would be required to defend it. Without that membership, the US has no unbreakable obligation to protect the country. Though NATO’s commitment to make Ukraine fully ready for membership is commendable, it is still less than what Ukraine needs to withstand Russia and political pressure in the US and possibly Europe.
The Challenge from Within
The governance of Europe complicates the problem. Germany’s Chancellor Scholz is unpopular at home. France’s President Macron has kept the extreme right from power but after recent elections will have difficulty in cobbling together a stable government coalition.
Italy’s Prime Minister Meloni is promoting a change in the constitution that will favor her right-wing coalition and prolong the life of her government. The UK now has a Labor government facing the task of restoring economic health despite having captured only 30 percent of the votes. Prime Minister Orbán of Hungary, now holding the presidency of the European Council for six months, and in power in Budapest since 2010, has become the pro-Putin cowboy of Europe. Without any consultation with NATO or the European Union and without any EU authority, he has visited Kyiv, Moscow, Beijing, and Mar-a-Lago in a grandstand trip to urge a negotiated end to the Russian-Ukrainian war.
The Challenge from the West
The Trump factor sits at the top of every European leader’s list of concerns. Mr. Trump has not liked Europe for years, believing that Europeans freeload off the US. If he carries through on his promise to settle the Russia-Ukraine war in one day, it is Europe’s security that also will go on the chopping block. In such an event, Putin will follow up with his campaign to undermine democracy in Europe, subvert Europe’s countries, and recapture control of eastern European states formerly members of the Warsaw Pact.
NATO has not left Europe bereft, however. Washington joined in saying Ukraine’s path to NATO was “irreversible,” set up new organizing and coordinating mechanisms, agreed to provide new missiles in Germany, and new Patriot systems to Ukraine. The Biden administration also praised the anticipated arrival of F-16s from Denmark and the Netherlands this summer, in addition to Belgium and Norway F-16s on the way and noted that Greece will provide other F-16s. NATO nations will provide an additional 40 billion euros next year to Ukraine. Other armaments are planned.
Washington should do more for Europe. Americans who complain about burden-sharing do not pay attention to some key factors. The most important is that the US wants to command the military strategy for NATO and wants to use American equipment for that purpose as much as feasible. Secondly, the American defense budget pays for US defense requirements around the world and not only for Europe, in contrast to most European allies. Lastly, American defense and military leadership (to say nothing of its arms manufacturers) often like allies to buy American equipment. All of these elements wear on European leadership and public opinion willingness to follow the American lead.
The Challenge for the Future
In a Foreign Affairs magazine article this June, three experts – French, British and American – addressed the issue of European security and raised interesting ideas. To support Europe’s obligation to prepare for continental security, priority should be given to the European partnership. Washington wants Europe to spend more on defense, but understandably doesn’t want to hand over the security lead to Europe. This still allows a focus on more investment in European military capacity and improved coordination among European members. The idea is not new; it was bruited first in NATO’s 1991 strategic concept and in the 1992 Maastricht Treaty. The collapse of the USSR and US criticism of Europe’s readiness for the subsequent Balkan Crisis discouraged progress at the time, however. Now is the moment to move ahead. The EU is the largest donor to Kyiv, more than the United States, and Europeans have furnished key military aid. Strengthening Europe’s defense does not remove NATO’s responsibility for protecting its European members against attack. Whoever contributes to the whole gets credit for defense of the whole.
Moreover, Europeans tend to recognize the indispensability of the American nuclear guarantee and defense support. Few Europeans want to turn over nuclear deterrence to France and Britain. Few want to have to decide which of Europe’s generals should command all the European forces for transatlantic security.
European allies, however, are already spending more, providing $380 billion in defense this year in total. As mentioned, they should be prepared to go to 2.5 or even 3.0 percent and above if necessary to protect their own countries and people. Since civil defense will be a major component for Europe’s defense in case of a general war, European contributions to this account also should be recognized. An additional number of defense needs, especially in technology, await effective European coordination and joint effort. On the manpower account, two years after the alliance agreed to provide 300,000 high readiness troops, European allies’ numbers have fallen or remained largely unchanged. Europe could better coordinate defense production. The European Defense Industrial Strategy now is trying to remedy the low level of collaborative procurement, production, and trade of defense equipment.
In short, the future for European security requires a renewed and serious effort by Europeans with encouragement and facilitation by the United States. Ursula von der Leyen, a champion of stronger European defense, has now been elected by the European Parliament to a second five-year term as president of the European Commission. Supported strongly by a spectrum of the parliament’s centralist parties plus conservative and Green supporters, she has deep and solid backing for her leadership. This rejection of extremists right and left widens and brightens the path ahead. She has pledged to create “a true European Defense Union” over the next five years, with flagship projects on air and cyber defense. Over time, the United States will be drawn more and more to the Indo-Pacific region. Europe has a stake there too, but first it has critical work to undertake at home. Doing well in Europe will earn deserved American praise. Doing well in Europe is doing well for NATO and for global protection for our shared democratic principles.
Ambassador Pearson is a retired professional Foreign Service Officer who was director general of the US Foreign Service from 2003 to 2006, repositioning the American Foreign Service to meet the new challenges of the 21st century and winning two national awards for his efforts. His other Washington assignments included serving as executive secretary of the State Department and on the National Security Council. He was US ambassador to Turkey from 2000 to 2003, deputy chief of mission (DCM) in Paris and served for seven years in Brussels, three heading the NATO political committee and four as DCM for the US Mission to NATO..